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IS A SECOND MOMMY A GOOD ENOUGH SECOND
PARENT?: WHY VOLUNTARY ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
OF PATERNITY SHOULD BE AVAILABLE
TO LESBIAN CO-PARENTS
By Julia Saladino1

I. Introduction
Janet Jenkins simply wants to see her
daughter. Jenkins and her former partner, Lisa
Miller, jointly agreed to parent a child together after
obtaining a civil union in Vermont.2 Miller completed
artificial insemination with the consent and support
of Jenkins. After Miller gave birth in Virginia to
the couple’s daughter, Isabella, the two women
cohabitated and co-parented in Virginia before
separating.3 Because Miller is the biological mother
of Isabella, she fervently tried to deny parental rights
to Jenkins after their separation. The case gained
considerable attention, and Miller filed custody
disputes in both Virginia and Vermont. Ultimately,
Virginia’s Supreme Court held that the Vermont
courts have jurisdiction, and Vermont’s Supreme
Court determined that Jenkins did in fact have
parental rights.4 Virginia, therefore, could not modify
the custody order. Even today, Miller continues to
appeal the case and objects to sharing physical custody
with Jenkins.5 Jenkins’ case is not particularly unique.
Same-sex parents all over the country face custody
disputes after separating.6 Often the biological parent
claims full parental authority, and if the parents live in
a state where same-sex marriages or civil unions are
not recognized, the non-biological parent may be left
with limited resources.7
These custody cases raise the family law issue
of what constitutes a parent. If both parties agree
to co-parent, what makes one parent more entitled
to parenting rights than the other? Does biology
dictate parenting rights when the couple has a preestablished agreement to co-parent? In states where
second parent adoption is incredibly difficult or not
available, non-biological parents have limited options
to gain legal parentage over their children.8 This
2

paper argues that alternative avenues for parental
rights, specifically Voluntary Acknowledgements of
Paternity (VAP) which allow the parties to establish
parentage by signing an affidavit shortly after the
child’s birth, should be available to lesbian co-parents.
I further argue that VAPs are appropriate devices to
establish consensual parentage rights at a child’s birth
and that making these forms available to lesbian coparents satisfies the equal protection clause of the
Constitution and meets Congress’ original policy
considerations in developing the federal VAP statute.
II. Background
The VAP process is a simplified
administrative procedure that allows the government
to easily identify parents in the absence of a marital
presumption of parentage.9 One of Congress’
original policy concerns for adopting VAP statutes
in the 1990s was to facilitate the collection of child
support funds.10 In order to put a simplified procedure
in place, Congress created a federal child support
enforcement statute, Title IV-D.11 To receive federal
funding, Congress requires each state to establish
informal procedures for establishing paternity.12
Consequently, each state has a VAP statute in place
to easily facilitate this process without requiring the
involvement of the judicial system every time an
unwed mother gives birth.13
An additional Congressional consideration
when promoting the VAP process is to encourage
the establishment of legal parentage as early in a
child’s life as possible. Because our legal system
recognizes two parents for children, the VAP process
is attractive and allows this determination to be
made with judicial ease.14 The legal determination
of parentage additionally follows the child and her
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parents throughout the country. Because a VAP is
treated as a court order, states view a VAP granted
in another state with full faith and credit, eliminating
the need to litigate parentage when a parent moves
across state lines.15 Not all findings of parentage are
afforded full faith and credit however.16 States are
allowed to refuse to grant full faith and credit to other
state’s statutes, so accordingly, a finding of parentage
based on a statute will not clearly always be afforded
full faith and credit outside that state.17
Court orders, unlike findings of parentage
based on a statute, have portability and are generally
granted full faith and credit.18 Since VAPs are treated
as judicial determinations, states should grant these
parentage determinations full faith and credit. This
full faith and credit aspect of the VAP process affords
greater administrative ease to the judicial system
and protects individual parental rights.19 Because
lesbian co-parents who cannot access second parent
adoptions need some form of legal protection that
transfers across state lines, access to the VAP process
could have significant and critical implications for
lesbian co-parents’ parental rights.
The VAP procedure consists of a hospitalbased program where an unmarried couple has
the option of signing an affidavit voluntarily
acknowledging paternity immediately before or after
the child’s birth. Some state VAP forms require that
the affidavits state that the parents have some reason
to believe that the male is the biological father.20
Additionally, VAPs serve as a judicial determination
of parentage and are very difficult to challenge later
in the child’s life. Typically, once both parents sign
a VAP, a court will overturn the determination of
parentage only if the male parent signed due to a
mother’s representation that amounts to fraud.21
In Andrew R. v. Arizona Dept. of Economic
Security, Andrew and Mother signed a VAP after
the birth of Isabella.22 Another man claiming
paternity over Isabella challenged the voluntary
acknowledgement of paternity. The court
determined that because Andrew R. and Isabella’s
mother signed the VAP, a judicial determination of
parentage stands despite evidence that another man
is Isabella’s actual biological father, and Andrew was
financially responsible for Isabella. The court noted
that after properly executed, a VAP in Arizona stands
unless challenged within 60 days on the basis of
fraud or duress. This case demonstrates the relative
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difficulty of dismissing a validly executed VAP after a
reasonable time period.
Although the state is often eager to find a
second parent to support a child to avoid financial
burden on the government, Andrew R. articulates
the burden an individual faces when challenging an
acknowledgement of paternity.23 Often, unless the
challenging party can prove fraud, duress, or material
mistake of fact, the finding of parentage established
through a VAP stands.24 Additionally, in cases where
the child’s education and or custody is at issue,
rather than challenging child support orders, courts
will honor VAPs, even in the absence of a father’s
biological tie to the child.25 These cases demonstrate
that VAPs are difficult to overturn, and that a party
challenging parentage based on a VAP faces a high
burden.26 Cases where judges have overturned
parentage determinations often contain some finding
of duress or fraud.27
Historically, the VAP process has been closed
off to lesbian co-parents. In states that model their
VAP statute on the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA)
and require the non-biological parent to attest to a
belief of biological parenthood, lesbian co-parents
are unable to meet this requirement.28 The UPA is
not a desirable model for state VAP statutes because
its gender specific language forecloses the VAP
procedure for lesbian couples.29 Federal legislation
does not have this requirement, and the male parent
signing the VAP is not compelled to attest to being
the biological father.30 If a state limits access to VAPs
to situations where both parents have a reason to
believe the father signing the affidavit is the biological
father, they are not made available to a lesbian partner.
Lesbian partners cannot claim biological parentage
when her partner is the biological parent.31 However,
case law demonstrates that even when parents sign
a VAP with knowledge that the listed father is not
the child’s biological father, the VAP will be still be
honored.32 The father’s false affidavit typically does
not constitute fraud or coercion because even though
the man knows he is not the biological father, he still
signs the VAP to demonstrate his agreement to coparent.33
Accordingly, state legislatures should not
follow the UPA model and should instead allow two
adults to consent to parentage immediately before
or after the child’s birth, regardless of biological
parenthood. Additionally, I argue that when two
3

lesbians make the decision to co-parent, the nonbiological parent should have the same ability to
establish parentage as a similarly situated male so as
not to violate equal protection. Finally, access to VAPs
for both heterosexual and lesbian parents furthers
Congress’ policy considerations of establishing
parentage early in a child’s life and ensuring that
children have two parents responsible for their needs,
and therefore lesbian co-parents should have an
option to sign a VAP.34
III. Analysis
A. Voluntary Acknowledgements of Paternity are
appropriate for use within lesbian parenting units
because courts do not always rely on biology to
determine parentage.
VAPs are an appropriate method of
establishing parentage of a lesbian partner because
courts uphold VAPs even in instances where the
father signs the affidavit with knowledge that he is
not the biological father.35 Under the federal statute
governing VAPs, a man may voluntarily acknowledge
his paternity as long as the mother consents.36
Federal law does not require genetic testing before
a man has access to the VAP process, indicating that
the “acknowledged father” may not always be the
biological father.37 Similarly, if a non-biological lesbian
partner wishes to acknowledge parentage and the
biological mother consents, federal and state statutes
should allow the couple to utilize the VAP procedure
to legally establish parentage. In some states, under
the current VAP process, a man acknowledging
paternity must attest that he believes himself to be
the biological father.38 However, in practice, a man
can use the system to establish parentage even with
the knowledge that he is not the biological father.39
Because VAPs are extremely difficult to overturn,
a heterosexual couple can essentially consent to
parentage and bypass the judicial process, while
lesbian couples are not allowed the same convenience.
One argument against allowing homosexual
couples access to the VAP process is that these
couples may circumvent adoption by doing so. A
lesbian co-parent that signs a VAP, however, is not
circumventing second-parent adoption any more so
than a heterosexual male co-parent accessing the VAP
process. Both the female and the male co-parent are
4

establishing parentage without first proving a genetic
tie to the child or completing the adoption procedure.
Adoptions are intended to terminate one party’s legal
parental rights and grant those rights to another party
or in the case of second-parent adoption, establish
a second parent’s parental rights.40 In an Ohio case,
the court determined that a gestational surrogacy
agreement rebutted a presumption of parentage
when the birth mother did not want to abide by the
surrogacy contract.41 This situation is a more accurate
example of circumventing adoption.
In this case, the appellee, an unmarried
woman, contacted an Ohio clinic to find anonymous
sperm and egg donors and a surrogate in order to
fulfill a gestational surrogate pregnancy. The clinic
located the appellant surrogate and the two women
along with the appellee’s fiancé entered into a
surrogacy agreement naming the appellee as the
intended mother and the appellant as the surrogate.
According to the contract all parental rights and
responsibilities belonged to the appellee, and the
appellant agreed to relinquish all rights. When the
appellant challenged the surrogacy agreement and
tried to establish herself as the child’s legal mother,
the appellate court determined that the surrogacy
agreement trumped the birth mother’s rights.42 The
judge relied on Ohio’s Parentage Act and reasoned that
“appellee’s voluntary acknowledgment of maternity
is sufficient to rebut the presumption that appellant
is the child’s natural mother by reason of her having
given birth to the child.”43 This Ohio case, however,
is not representative of how the VAP process should
operate for lesbian couples, where in most cases the
lesbian co-parent would be establishing parentage of
her partner’s biological or birth child. Additionally,
because many states do not grant second parent
adoptions for same-sex co-parents, lesbian couples
may be in even more dire need for the VAP process
than heterosexual couples.44
In Chicago, Illinois a judge upheld a
VAP despite contradictory biological evidence. A
heterosexual couple that had dated in the past but
never married agreed to sign a VAP when Torres gave
birth in 2001.45 Torres tried to extinguish Huddleston’s
paternity despite the fact that Huddleston had acted
as a parent for two years, playing with the child,
changing diapers, and contributing to the child’s
financial needs. The Domestic Relations Judge
determined that the parties exhibited a clear and
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unambiguous intent to name Huddleston as father
of the child. Because both parties contributed to
the misrepresentation, the fact that the affidavit
was improperly signed was immaterial to the case.
Huddleston, though not the biological father, was
determined to have legal rights to the child.46 The
judge strongly considered Huddleston’s active role in
the child’s life for the preceding two years. The judge
reasoned that “both parties are participants in what
the court views as their clear, unambiguous intent
to denominate Mr. Huddleston as the parent of this
child,” and therefore the VAP must remain valid.47
A lesbian non-biological parent who intends
to act as a child’s parent should have the option of
legally establishing paternity through the use of a
VAP. If biology is not the determinative factor for
heterosexual couples that utilize the VAP process,
then biology alone should not bar a same-sex, nonbiological parent from accessing the VAP procedure.48
Even though the VAP system in some states is
premised on biological considerations, in practice,
a finding contrary to an attestation of biological
parenthood often does not void a VAP. As a result,
lesbian non-biological parents should have the same
access as heterosexual male parents.
The Supreme Court has also suggested that
biology is not the determinative factor in establishing
parentage. The Court held that the law does not
recognize the rights of biological parents claiming a
relationship to a child when a marital parental unit
exists. In Michael H. v. Gerald D., Michael sought
recognition as a dual father for a child born to a
woman with whom he was previously engaged in an
affair.49 Because the mother was married to Gerald at
the time of the child’s birth, Gerald had parental rights
because of California’s marital presumption.50 Even
though Michael maintained a parental relationship
with the child, Justice Scalia held that Michael’s
relationship with his daughter is not “an interest
traditionally protected by our society.”51 Michael,
therefore, was legally barred from being the child’s
father. While this case stands for the proposition of
privileging parental rights in marital relationships,
Michael H. also demonstrates that biology alone is
not the determinative factor granting custody. The
holding in Michael H. opposes a functional parenting
framework but still supports the proposition that
biology is not the ultimate threshold for parental
rights.52 Accordingly, the law should allow lesbian,
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non-biological parents parental rights even despite
the absence of a biological connection to the child.
Because biology is not determinative of the
validity of a VAP, states should eliminate the affidavit
of “believed biology” in their VAP statutes and
forms and instead adopt an affidavit that establishes
the signing parent expects and consents to act as
a parent to the child assuming all the rights and
responsibilities that accompany parentage. Parentage
should reflect a functional parenting framework
rather than a biological parenthood requirement.
Functional parenthood applies when a person acts as
a parent without being a child’s biological parent. A
person who has a relationship with the child, cares
for the child, and supports the child while not having
a biological relationship to the child is an example of
a functional parent.53
As familial make-ups in society continue to
change and expand, legislatures and judges are more
willing to define, create, and interpret family law in
ways that do not only consider biology.54 Courts
that are willing to liberally interpret the definition of
parenthood and family have increasingly looked to
what is in the child’s best interests when paternity is
challenged.55 For example, a father who has acted as a
child’s parent and then finds genetic proof that he is
not the father may still have parental responsibilities
to that child.56 If a court finds that the father has
sufficiently acted as a parent and established a
continued relationship with the child, then the court
may determine that maintaining that parent-child
relationship is in the best interests of the child.
Instead of relying primarily on biology, judges should
be more willing to consider the functional parenting
of the parent and make a determination that prefers
relationships to genetics.
B. Denying Voluntary Acknowledgements of
Paternity to a non-biological parent in a lesbian
couple unconstitutionally discriminates on the
basis of gender and therefore violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Denying a non-biological lesbian partner the
option of signing a VAP violates equal protection
because similarly situated male, heterosexual parents
are allowed to sign a VAP and the discrimination is
not substantially related to the important government
interest. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United
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States Constitution provides that “no state shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”57 Because a male that is not a
child’s biological father is able to sign a VAP without
first genetically establishing paternity, a similarly
situated female must have the same opportunity.
Therefore, a non-biological lesbian parent who
wants to establish paternity through a VAP must be
afforded that option in order for a state’s VAP statute
to satisfy equal protection.
Laws that differentiate based on the parent’s
gender will not survive equal protection challenges
unless the laws satisfy intermediate scrutiny.58 To
stand, the law must serve an important government
interest and the law must be substantially related to
that interest.59 In cases where states create parenting
statutes that differentiate based on gender, the
Supreme Court may invalidate those statutes if
they do not satisfy intermediate scrutiny. In Caban
v. Mohammed, a New York law gave mothers the
absolute right to consent to adoption.60 Caban,
the father, and Mohammed, the mother, had two
children together but never married. After the
couple separated, Caban petitioned for adoption of
the children, and Mohammed cross-petitioned. The
court granted Mohammed custody based on the
New York Domestic Relations statute that allows
an unwed mother, but not an unwed father, to block
their child’s adoption by withholding her consent. The
Supreme Court held that the sex-based distinction
between unwed mothers and unwed fathers in the
New York statute violated the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment because it bore no
substantial relation to any important state interest.61
Similarly, in Stanley v. Illinois, the Supreme
Court struck down an Illinois statute that made
children of unwed parents wards of the State upon
their mothers’ death.62 Stanley, a biological and
functional parent for his four children, challenged the
law when the state placed his children in the care of
court appointed guardians after their mother died.
Stanley’s parental rights were effectively terminated,
despite other statutory provisions that required a
showing of unfitness to terminate parental rights.63
Because the court never proved that Stanley was an
unfit parent, rather, it discriminated against him on
the basis of his status as an unwed-father, Stanley
argued that the state statute violated the equal
protection clause. The Court held that the Illinois
6

law violated equal protection because removing a
child from an unwed father after the mother’s death,
when the father had an existing relationship with the
children, did not further the state’s interest of having
children cared for by fit parents.64
Based on the holdings in Caban and Stanley,
state legislatures should create VAP statutes that
refuse to differentiate on the basis of gender. VAP
statutes that preference male parents over female
parents violate equal protection if they do not
meet intermediate scrutiny because the gender
distinction is not substantially related to an important
government interest. If the government’s interest is
administrative ease and establishing parentage early
in a child’s life when an unwed mother gives birth, a
VAP statute that only allows male parents to establish
parentage is not substantially related to that interest.
Such a statute would likely meet rational basis review
but is under-inclusive and fails to satisfy the higher
level of scrutiny required when analyzing laws that
discriminate on the basis of gender. However, when
a lesbian mother is impregnated and gives birth by
means of artificial insemination, there is likely no
male that will claim parentage at the child’s birth.
There could, however, be a female co-parent who
wants to establish parentage. As both a legal and
policy matter, VAP statutes should not deny access to
female co-parents.
In Nguyen v. INS, however, Nguyen challenged
the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a).65 This
section of the U.S. Code governs the acquisition
of U.S. citizenship of a child born to unmarried
parents when only one parent is a U.S. citizen. The
statute has different requirements for granting a child
citizenship depending on whether the citizen parent
is the mother or the father; the law makes it much
more difficult for a citizen father to confer his U.S.
citizenship to his child. The Supreme Court held that
the statute survived intermediate scrutiny because
although it involved classifications based on gender
– raising the burden of the father above the burden
of the mother – the law also achieved important
government objectives of ensuring that the father
is biologically related to the child and that the child
and parent have everyday ties.66 There is no need for
the statute to impose these additional requirements
on the mother because she necessarily will be with
the child at birth and is guaranteed an opportunity
to establish a relationship with the child. Nguyen,
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therefore, provides an example of where the Court
held that a gender-based parentage classification
did not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution and that a priority for biological ties is
an important state interest.67
Still, Nguyen does not unequivocally support
gender-based classifications based on biology. In the
VAP situation, both a father and a lesbian co-parent
both have the potential to lack biological ties to
the child. Signing a VAP affirms that the co-parent
agrees to accept parental rights and responsibilities
associated with the child, regardless of biology. The
need to establish and promote biological ties is not
furthered by excluding a co-parent when a biological
mother is unmarried and consents to sharing parental
rights with another parent.
Although Nguyen does establish that a genderbased classification in parentage determinations is
acceptable to uphold certain governmental interests,
the VAP process does not reflect one of those
instances where a distinction is justified. In support
of the gender-based distinction in the VAP process,
the government might claim that it has an interest
in providing a child with a father rather than simply a
second parent.68 Government and society’s preference
for a two parent, opposite gender household is often
premised on the notion that this is a healthier, more
stable environment where children will grow up to
understand and conform to their established gender
roles.69 Such a justification, however, is not a valid
reason to place an unconstitutional gender-based
distinction on parentage determinations.70 Most
distinctions between a father and a second parent
would be based on stereotypes and are, therefore, not
legitimate government interests that will satisfy equal
protection.71
In the context of the VAP process, if a nonbiological male can consent to parentage through
the VAP process, then in order to satisfy equal
protection, a non-biological female should have the
same access to the VAP procedure. While Congress
and state legislatures may have intended states only
to use VAPs in cases where an unwed mother can
identify a potential biological father, in reality the
statutes are often not used in that way and the finding
of parentage is still upheld. In In the Matter of J.B.
and J.G., J.B. was listed on the child’s birth certificate
and signed an affidavit of paternity.72 After a
disagreement regarding the child’s schooling, J.B. filed
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in family court to establish his parental rights, and J.G.
responded by alleging that J.B. was not the biological
father and therefore did not have any parental rights.73
The court determined that despite genetic testing
that confirmed that J.B. was not biologically related
to the child, overturning a previously established
determination of parentage would be inconsistent
with the legislature’s intent.74 The court reasoned that
because biology is not the sole avenue to establish
parentage, the legislature intended for an expansive
definition of parent.75 Because J.B. correctly followed
procedure to establish himself as a parent under the
law, his lack of a biological relationship to the child
did not bar him from enjoying the same parental
rights to care and make decisions for the child as the
mother.76 Accordingly, state VAP statutes should not
differentiate based on the co-parent’s gender and lack
of biological ties to the child and should allow lesbian
parents to access the VAP process.
C. Use of Voluntary Acknowledgements of Paternity
within lesbian parenting couples furthers Congress’
original policy considerations in enacting the federal
VAP statute.
Allowing same-sex couples access to VAPs
furthers Congress’ original policy considerations to
create judicial and administrative ease in determining
a child’s parentage and allow for efficient collection
of child support funds.77 In a child support system
based on legal paternity rather than biology, allowing
a co-parent to establish parentage early in the child’s
life identifies another adult who is responsible for
financially supporting the child. To further this goal,
federal law states that after the 60-day rescission
period, the parties may only challenge a VAP on the
basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake.78 Once
the parties have identified a second legal, financially
responsible parent, Congress does not allow the
parties to rescind the finding arbitrarily. By making
the process of invalidating a VAP more difficult,
the government can collect child support more
efficiently because the parties have already consented
to being financial responsible for the child. If the
couple separates before the child reaches the age of
majority, or the couple chooses to never maintain a
relationship, the parties will have already established
paternity through the VAP process, and a judicial
hearing to determine paternity will not be necessary
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for the government to determine which individuals
are responsible for paying child support.
In some jurisdictions, if a custodial parent
requires government assistance, the government
will reimburse itself by enforcing a child support
order against the other biological parent (District
of Columbia operates this way). First, however, the
government must find this individual, and spends
public resources doing so. If a second parent can
establish paternity through the VAP process, the
co-parent responsible for financially supporting the
child has already been identified, and the government
will not have to expend resources ascertaining the
second responsible parent.79 Allowing all couples,
regardless of sexual orientation, to access the VAP
process would relieve the government of the burden
of soliciting personal information on a child’s other
parent from a birth mother on public assistance.
Additionally, the court system would also
be freed from the burden of judicially establishing
the paternity of the other responsible parent. The
VAP process, as it was intended, already allows
heterosexual parents to consent to a judicial finding
of paternity. Allowing both heterosexual and lesbian
couples access to this system permits the government
to identify a co-parent in an additional situation
where the parents are willing to consent to a judicial
finding of paternity, thereby furthering Congress’
goal of creating administrative ease and efficient
collection of child support. 80 Parents and children
would be best served and legally protected, and the
government’s objectives of administrative efficiency
would be met, if state legislatures allow same-sex
parents to consent to parentage through a VAP just
as heterosexual, unmarried parents are allowed.
IV. Conclusion
Congress created the VAP system to allow
unwed mothers the opportunity to establish the
paternity of a father at the child’s birth with relative
simplicity. Such a system relieves both the judicial and
administrative agencies of the burden of determining
who are – or should be – a child’s parents. Although
no states currently allow same-sex couples access to
the VAP process, legislatures should open the VAP
system to same-sex couples. In practice, biology is
not the controlling factor for upholding paternity, and
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therefore, biology should not be the determinative
criteria for allowing access to the VAP process.
Additionally, allowing a similarly situated man access
to the system but denying that same access to a woman
violates equal protection; the government interests
Congress identified are not substantially related to
the gender discrimination in the VAP system. Finally,
to satisfy Congress’ goals of establishing parentage
and allowing for ease in collecting child support,
lesbian couples should have access to a system that
easily creates a judicial determination of parentage.
If two adults agree to co-parent and the mother is
willing to consent to parentage, access to the VAP
system creates ease for the government, the parents,
and the child, and as a matter of public policy, the
system should be accessible to both heterosexual and
lesbian couples.
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